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1. Introduction
Since 1979 China has carried out important economic reforms both in the agricultural
sector and in the nonagricultural sectors in order to increase productivity and improve the
level of living of Chinese households. To achieve these objectives economic controls have
gradually been relaxed and market incentives have been introduced. Although the Chinese
government still determines the wages of workers in state- and collective-owned enterprises
and in the public sector, more economic incentives are provided for the workers, of which the
introduction of a bonus payments is the most important. Altogether, these reforms resulted
in a rapid increase in productivity and output. Faced by the hypothesis that there are a trade-
off between economic policies that guarantee a minimum income with low level of inequality
and policies that provide a higher overall level of income at the cost of higher inequality, the
following questions may be addressed:
(i) have households increased their level of living?
(ii) has the structure in the composition of different income factors changed?
(iii) how is the impact on the distribution of income?
These important policy questions will be studied by means of individual household
data from the State Statistical Bureau's Urban Household Survey during the 1986-1990
period. In this paper we focus on urban household income inequality in the provinces Sichuan
and Liaoning. By contrast, most studies on income inequality in China consider nationwide
income inequality and its sensitivity to changes in the urban/rural income gap.
The evaluation of inequality in the distribution of income is of fundamental importance
in order to make judgement on welfare and the level of living in a society. Most of the
available empirical information on economic inequality in developing countries refers to the
distribution of income among earners. This information constitutes an important part of a
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complete description of the labor market and related distributions of income, but it is less
helpful in the analysis of inequality as a welfare issue. A more relevant approach is to
compare income levels among households of equal size and composition. This paper focuses
mainly on couples with one child which, as a result of the current birth control policy, turn
out to be the predominating household group in China. However, to allow for comparison of
relative economic position of persons, regardless of which type of household they live in, we
also introduce household income divided by household size as a welfare indicator.
Our methodological approach is mainly based on a measure of inequality, called the
A-coefficient, which is closely related to the Gini coefficient. The essential difference is that
the A-coefficient is more sensitive than the Gini coefficient to inequality in the lowest part
of the income distribution. This means that the A-coefficient exhibits a higher degree of
inequality aversion than the Gini coefficient, irrespective the functional form of the income
distribution in question. For that reason, the A-coefficient always takes larger values than the
Gini coefficient, which means that the cost of inequality always is larger if the society's
ethical norms coincides with the A-coefficient than if it coincides with the Gini coefficient.
The following section discusses the properties of the employed measures of inequality
and suggests a method for interpreting the magnitude of changes in inequality. Sections 3 and
4 deal with the description of the wend and structure in household income inequality in urban
Sichuan and Liaoning during the 1986-1990 period. Section 5 examines the distribution of
well-being across persons by applying household income divided by household size as welfare
indicator. Section 6 summarizes the findings and the conclusions of the paper.
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2. Measurement and Decomposition of Inequality
In order to evaluate the deviation of each household's income from that of a household
living in a society of complete equality, the standard approach is to employ the Lorenz curve.
The Lorenz curve relates the cumulative proportion of income units to the cumulative
proportion of income received when units are arranged in ascending order. Thus, the Lorenz
curve captures the essence of inequality when inequality is defined as the deviation from the
state of equality and restricted to satisfy the principles of transfers and scale invariance. The
principle of scale invariance states that inequality should remain unaffected if each income
is altered in the same proportion and it requires, therefore, the inequality measure to be
independent of the scale of measurement. The principle of transfers implies that if a transfer
of income takes place from a richer to a poorer person without changes in the relative
positions, the level of inequality diminishes. When employed as a criterion for ranking income
distributions the Lorenz curve is, however, incomplete. Therefore, several summary measures
of inequality have been derived to provide complete ranking of distributions. The most widely
used measure of inequality is the Gini coefficient, which satisfies the principles of scale
invariance and transfers. The reader is referred to Sen (1973) for a more comprehensive
discussion of the normative implications of different measures of inequality.
2.1. Measures of inequality
As is welanown, the Gini coefficient (G) is related to the Lorenz curve (L) in the
following way
(2.1)	 G = f[l -2L(u)]clu.
M(u) = E[X IX5F -1(u)] oSu51,(2.2)
EX
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The Gini coefficient offers a method for ranking distributions and quantifying the differences
in inequality between distributions which is widely used in applied work. This practice,
however, is questionable. Evidently, no single measure can reflect all aspects of inequality
of a distribution, only summarize it to a certain extent. Consequently, it is important to have
alternatives to the Gini coefficient As pointed out by Atkinson (1970), the Gini coefficient
assigns more weight to transfers in the centre of a unimodal distribution than at the tails. As
a supplement to the Gini coefficient, we will employ an inequality measure - the A-coefficient
- that assigns more weight to transfers at the lower tail than at the centre and the upper tail.
For any distribution whatsoever, the inequality is higher when measured by A than by G.
Therefore, a social decision-maker who adopts the A-coefficient for judging income
distributions with respect to inequality displays more aversion to inequality than a decision-
maker who adopts the Gini coefficient.
The A-coefficient, see Aaberge (1986), has a similar geometric interpretation and
relation to the inequality curve M defined by
as the Gini coefficient has to the Lorenz curve. Here X has distribution function F. The A-
coefficient is defined by
(2.3) A = f[1-M(u)Nu.
0
If X is an income variable, then M(u) for a fixed u expresses the ratio of the mean income
of the poorest 100u per cent of the population to the mean income of the population. As is
wellknown, the egalitarian line of the Lorenz curve is the straight line joining the points (0,0)
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and (1,1). The egalitarian line of the M-curve is the horizontal line joining the points (0,1)
and (1,1). Thus, the family of M-curves is bounded by a unit square, while the family of
Lorenz-curves is bounded by a triangle. Therefore, there is a sharper visual distinction
between two different M-curves than between the two corresponding Lorenz curves. Note that
the M-curve will be equal to the diagonal line (M(u)=u) if and only if the underlying
distribution is uniform (0,a) for an arbitrary a. The A-coefficient then takes the value 0.5,
while the maximum attainable value is 1 and the minimum attainable value is 0.
Note that M(u) = L(u)/u, which implies
(11 _ L(uldu.










respectively, where X(1) S X(2)	 X(,,) are the ordered observations.
2.2. Interpreting changes in measures of inequality in terms of a hypothetical redistribution
In order to compare changes in inequality over time for a given population, the




since there do not exist any theoretical grounds for the unit interval as scale of measurement
for inequality measures, a method for quantifying how important any observed change in
inequality might be is needed. A method suggested by Blackburn (1989) involves a
hypothetical redistribution of a constant amount of income, from every income unit below the
median level of income to every income unit above the median, so as to make the value of
an inequality measure for the distribution in question (for which the redistribution is applied)
equal to the inequality for some other distribution. In this paper we propose a somewhat
different approach. The similarity consists of adopting the idea of a hypothetical intervention
of a tax/transfer reform. Suppose, for example, that the Gini coefficient increased from Gl in
year 1 to (k+1) G I (k>0) in year 2, i.e., an increase of 100k per cent. As will be proved below
this increase in inequality corresponds to introducing an equal-sized lump-sum tax of 100k
per cent of the mean income in year 1 followed by transferring the collected tu revenue as
proportional transfers where each unit receives 100k per cent of its income in year 1. Note
that this intervention leaves the mean income unchanged. By contrast, suppose the Gird
coefficient declined from year 1 to year 2, i.e. k < 0. Introducing a proportional tax with tax
rate equal to 100(-k) per cent and then transferring the derived tax as equal-sized amounts
(the mean tax) to the units, the Gini coefficient decreases by 100(-k) per cent. Thus, if
inequality declines the introduced intervention consists of a series of progressive transfers,
while increased inequality corresponds to introduce a series of regressive transfers.
Let X be a random income variable with cumulative distribution function F 1 and
1.4=EX1. Now, introducing the above intervention, where -1 < k < 1 is the tax/transfer rate,
the income after intervention is distributed according to kw 2 defmecl by
(2.7)	 )12 = (1 + k)X i -
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It follows readily from (2.7) that E 2 = EX 1 , i.e., the mean income is unchanged. Let
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(2.9)
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where F1-1 and P2-1 are the left inverse of F1 and P2, respectively. Since F 1 and P2 have equal




L2(u) (l+k)It(u) - ku,	 0Su51.








02 = (1 +k)G i .
Thus, if we experience a decline in inequality (k<0) then L2 is a mixture of L1 and the
Lorenz curve for complete equality. By contrast, if k>0 then Li is a mixture of 17,2 and the
equality curve. In order to avoid negative incomes after redistribution it is (in situations with
increase in inequality) necessary to require the condition min X1 > (k/k+l)gi to be fullfilled.
For example, if income inequality increases by 20 per cent then the lowest income has to be
larger than 1/6 of the mean income.
8
23. Decomposition of inequality
Given the inequality in the distribution function F measured by A or G, the next step
is to identify the sources that make substantial contribution to the inequality. Assume that the
main variable X is the sum of s different factor components,
(2.13)
* According to Aaberge (1986), A admits the following decomposition
	
(2.14)	 A = E
where gi/g is the ratio between the means of Xi and X, respectively, and ai can be interpreted
as the conditional A-inequality of factor i given the units rank order in X. Analogously,
	
(2.15)	 G
where yi is related to G and has a similar interpretation as ai related to A.
Notice that a; and yi are measures of correlation between factor i, Xi, and X. Assume
for example that Ili > O. Then, a negative value of ai or yi expresses negative correlation and
means that factor i has an equalizing effect on the inequality in the distribution F of X. A
positive value expresses a disequalizing effect on the inequality in F. For gi < 0, then positive
values of ai and yi express an equalizing effect on the inequality in F. We call ai and yi
concentration coefficients which is in accordance with Mahalanobis (1960).
If ai and yi are equal to 0, then every household (or individual) receives an equal
amount of factor i. Thus, factor i does neither hold a disequalizing nor an equalizing effect
on the distribution F of X. We say that factor i holds a neutral effect.
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The above interpretation of the concentration coefficients is based on a consideration
where the influence of the different factor components on the overall income inequality is
judged simultaneously. If we instead are interested in the impact on overall income inequality
from increasing factor i income solely, given that all the concentration coefficients are
assumed fixed, this follows from the following elasticities which are established by
straightforward differentiation,
(2.16) alogA	 (ai _	 1,2,...,s
alogg iri 	A
(2.17) alogG _	 .-- 1	 = 1,2,...,s.
G
The formulas (2.16) and (2.17) yield the marginal effects on A and G from a small increase
of an income factor, conditional on fixed concentration coefficients. From the expressions
(2.16) and (2.17) we see that overall inequality will increase (decrease) if and only if the
current concentration coefficient is larger (smaller) than the overall inequality. Hence, we may
obtain a decline in inequality even if the corresponding concentration coefficient exhibits a
disequalizing effect.
3. The trend in household income inequality
According to Blank and Blinder (1986) income inequality has, historically, increased
during economic recessions and declined during recoveries. These cyclical swings in
inequality, however, do not coincide with the evidence given by Danziger et al. (1989). Their
results are related to the economic recovery in the United States during the 1982-1987 period
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and revealed a substantial increase in income inequality. However, this evidence is entirely
restricted to pure market economies and thus not directly transferable to the mixed economic
system in China. During the recent decade a series of market-oriented economic reforms have
been introduced in order to increase productivity and improve the level of living of Chinese
households. Important aspects of the reforms were to decentralize decisions to the local
government level or even to the firm level and allow firms to retain a larger fraction of profits
and to make use of bonus payment Altogether, the economic reforms resulted in a
considerable increase in productivity and output and on average in the level of living. Now,
the question is whether or not the success in the Chinese economy has been attained at the
cost of increased income inequality. This question will be discussed by means of individual
household data from the State Statistical Bureau's Urban Households Survey for urban
Sichuan and Liaoning during the 1986-1990 period. The Sichuan province is situated in the
central part of China and is the largest province with about 110 million people or 10 per cent
of the total population in 1990. Liaoning is situated in the northeast of China and had a
population of about 40 million people in 1990. The 1990-data have previously been applied
by Aaberge et al. (1992) to examine the structure of economic inequality in 1990. Their
results refer to distributions of households income, expenditure and savings.
In this section we focus on income inequality among households living in urban
regions of Sichuan and Liaoning. A household is defmed to include all persons living in the
same dwelling and having common board. The results for all households provide important
information about household inequality, but must be interpreted with caution when used as
a basis for analysis of welfare. This is mainly due to variation in household size and
composition. However, by emphasizing comparison of relative economic position of
households of equal size and composition we avoid to adjust for differences of this type.
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In this section we will mainly focus on couples with 1 child less than 18 years.
However, to allow for comparison of well-being across persons irrespective of which type of
household they live in, we also introduce household income divided by household size as a
welfare indicator in Section 5. Our emphasis on couples with one child is firstly due to the
fact that this particular household group constitutes roughly half the population of urban
households in these provinces and secondly due to the fact that the majority of the children
are living together with their parents in three-person families. In that respect we also obtain
important information about economic inequality among children.
Total household income includes all cash income received by the household during
the year, but excludes sources of spending such as bank deposits withdrawn, money borrowed
from relatives or friends, and repayment of debt by others. In order to give a suggestion of
the trend in the magnitude of the income differences between couples with 1 child, Table 1
provides mean incomes in 1990 Yuan by each decile of couples with 1 child living in urban
Sichuan and Liaoning, respectively. For 19864989 the household incomes are adjusted for
price changes using the urban consumer price indexes for Sichuan and Liaoning.
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Table 1. Annual mean income s') for couples with 1 child living in urban Sichuan and
Liaoning by decile groups, 1986-1990
Province Sichuan Liaoning
, Decile group 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
1 3348 3152 2902 2761 2836 3089 3372 3226 906 3495
2 4058 3889 3567 3470 3529 3658 3886 3807 3095 4036
3 4347 4189 3961 3749 3967 3890 4197 4226 3960 4362
4 4558 4451 4280 4084 4413 4073 4435 4473 4364 4651
5 4734 4716 4595 4307 4764 4276 4618 4757 4657 4993
6 4945 5062 4827 4608 5051 4468 4818 5066 4943 5310
7 5201 5393 5177 5001 5427 4634 5032 5366 5237 5543
8 5479 5702 5623 5441 5780 4782 5275 5655 5563 5849
9 5982 6180 6218 5997 6312 5131 5619 6104 5904 6284
10 7261 7075 7918 7235 7294 6392 6552 7102 6901 7542
All 4991 4981 4907 4665 4937 4439 4781 4978 4553 5207
*) Yuan figures are at 1990 prices.
The income figures in Table 1 show that the 1986-1990 period was one of relatively
steady growth in the mean income of 1 child couples living in urban Liaoning, while the
corresponding mean incomes in urban Sichuan were reasonably steady at the 1986 level.
These regularities were, however, distorted in 1989 by a notable decline in the level of
income, which was mainly caused by sharp increases in the consumer prices in 1988 and in
1989. Note, however, that the extremely low mean income of the lowest decile group in
Liaoning in 1989 can be due to a bias caused by the sample design. Until 1990 the industrial
structure formed the basis for selection of households in Liaoning; households were selected
as clusters according to the addresses of the employers. Because of the restructuring of the
industry in Liaoning several enterprises were closed down in 1989, which again led to
reduced annual wage earnings for the affected employees. It appears, however, that the sample
households were more heavily affected by plant closures than the remaining part of the
population. Thus, the 1989-figures for Liaoning must be interpreted with caution. By contrast,
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in Sichuan the survey design and selection of households were based on the dwelling
addresses of the households.
As a result of the economic changes during the 1986-1990 period the mean income
in urban Sichuan changed from being 12 per cent above the mean income in urban Liaoning
in 1986 to become 5 per cent below the mean income in urban Liaoning in 1990. The figures
in Table 1 demonstrate that this pattern is particularly visual among the poor. In order to sum
up the annual income differences displayed in Table 1, Table 2 provides estimates of the A-
coefficient and the Gini coefficient, respectively. Similar estimates for all households are
given in Table 3.
Table 2. Estimatesa) of the A-coefficient and the Gini coefficient in distributions of income
for couples with one child living in urban Sichuan and Liaoning, 1986-1990
Province Sichuan Liaoning
Year 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Number of
observations 264 253 212 210 199 185 273 276 298 323
A-coefficient .175 .195 .228 .228 .227 .164 .157 .192 .328 .182
(.009) (.008) (.011) (.013) (.010) (.012) (.007) (.008) (.018) (.007)
Gini coefficient .115 .126 .156 .151 .148 .107 .102 .125 .188 .122
(.006) (.005) (.008) (.008) (.007) (.008) (.005) (.006) (.013) (.006)
Standard deviations are given in parentheses.
Table 3. Estimates *) of the A-coefficient and the Gini-coefficient in distributions of income
for households living in urban Sichuan and Liaoning, 1986-1990
Province Sichuan Liaoning
Year 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Number of
observations 600 599 550 550 550 600 600 600 600 597
A-coefficient .235 .245 .283 .301 .303 .229 .245 .283 .355 .257
(.008) (.007) (.008) (.009) (.010) , (.007) (.008) (.009) (.012) (.008)
Gini coefficient .156 .162 .188 .199 .200 .155 .171 .189 .221 .174
(.005) (.005) (.006) (.006) (.007) (.005) (.006) (.007) (.009) (.006)
Standard deviations are given in parentheses.
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According to Table 2 income inequality among couples with 1 child living in urban
Sichuan increased considerably during the 1986-1988 recovery. By contrast, mean real income
did not change. When measured by the A-coefficient income inequality for this household
group stabilized on the 19884eve1 during the 1988-1990 period. Similarly, income inequality
for couples with 1 child living in urban Liaoning increased during the 1986-1988 period and
then in 1990 declined below the 1988-level. Between 1986 and 1990, the increase in
inequality in Liaoning was 11 per cent measured by the A-coefficient and 14 per cent
measured by the Gini coefficient. In Sichuan the corresponding changes in inequality were
30 per cent and 29 per cent, respectively.
The results for all households reported in Table 3 more or less confirm the picture
given by Table 2. Due to heterogeneity in household size and composition the level of
inequality was, however, substantially higher for all households than for couples with 1 child.
In order to give an interpretation of the magnitude of changes in the A-coefficient, we
shall employ the hypothetical intervention discussed in Section 2.2. Between 1986 and 1988
the A-coefficient for couples with 1 child living in urban Sichuan and Liaoning increased by
30.3 per cent and 17.1 per cent, respectively. In Sichuan this increase in inequality
corresponds to imposing an equal-sized lump sum tax equal to 30.3 per cent of the mean
income in 1986 followed by redistributing the collected tax revenue as proportional transfers
equal to 30.3 per cent of each couple's income in 1986. Thus, this specific intervention is
composed of a series of regressive transfers, each of which increases inequality. For instance,
the first decile group faces a hypothetical income loss of 0.303 (4991-3348) Yuan = 497
Yuan. By contrast, the tenth decile group faces an income gain of 687 Yuan.
If, however, the Gini coefficient forms the basis of the measurement of inequality, then
income inequality among couples with one child living in urban Sichuan and Liaoning
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increased between 1986 and 1988 by 35.7 per cent and 16.8 per cent, respectivley.
Consequently, the increased inequality in Sichuan was higher when measured by the Gini
coefficient than measured by the A-coefficient. This distinction is due to the fact that both
the lower and the central part of the 1986-distribution were heavily affected during the 1986-
1988 period. Moreover, from the discussion in Section 2.1 we know that the Gini coefficient
is much more sensitive to the changes in the central part of the distribution than the A-
coefficient. By contrast, the A-coefficient puts its main focus on changes concerning the
lowest 20 per cent of the distribution.
To get a better understanding of the hypothetical intervention mentioned above, we
provide in Table 4 decile-specific mean incomes determined by a hypothetical intervention
of the 1986-incomes of couples with one child so as to make the value of inequality measures
equal to their values in 1988. For the sake of comparison recall the figures of the 1986-
columns of Table 1.
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Table 4. Mean income for couples with one child living in urban Sichuan and Liaoning by
decile groups after a hypothetical redistribution of the incomes in 1986 so as to
make the values of the A-coefficient and the Gini coefficient equal to their




A = 0.228 G = 0.156 A = 0.192 G = 0.125
1 2855 2762 2858 2862
2 3775 3725 3524 3527
3 4152 4117 3796 3798
4 4427 4403 4010 4011
5 4656 4642 4248 4249
6 4931 4928 4473 4473
7 5264 5275 4667 4667
8 5627 5653 4840 4840
9 6282 6335 5249 5247
10 7948 8670 6725 6721
All 4991 4991 4439 4439
4. Decomposition of household income inequality
Since it is of obvious interest to identify the sources that made substantial
contributions to the level and changes in the level of inequality in urban Sichuan and
Liaoning during the 1986-1990 period, this section is devoted to decomposition of overall
inequality with respect to five basic income sources: wage earnings in state-owned units,
wage-earnings in collective-owned units, other income from work units, income from current
transfers and other income.
Wage earnings in state-owned or collective-owned units are the total wages of
household members employed in state-owned or collective-owned enterprises, government
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offices and other institutions. Such wages consist of base wage, bonuses, floating salary and
contractual income. Floating salary is a flexible salary, the amount of which depends upon
the quality of work produced. Contractual income is the income that staff and workers in
some state-owned and collective-owned enterprises earn from work they are contracted to
perform. The amount of the contractual income is equal to the total income derived from the
contracted activities minus all production costs, taxes, and profits set by contract.
Other income from work units consists mainly of housing subsidies and covering of
medical insurance from the work unit.
Income from current transfers includes pension and compensation for increasing food
prices.
Other income consists of income from selfemployment, secondary employment,
property and gifts and other special income.
As demonstrated in Section 2.3, the applied decomposition method views each income
factor's contribution to overall income inequality as the product of its fraction of and
correlation with total income. In analyzing each income factor's contribution to overall
inequality this method has the advantage over the common stepwise methods of being
independent of the order by which the income factors are entering. The standard approach in
applied work is to compare inequality with and without the income factor in question. For
example, in examining the question whether working wives decrease family income
inequality, Horwath (1980) and Danziger (1980) employed this approach. Thus, their results
depend on whether one compares family income inequality with income inequality between
husbands or with income inequality between wives. In answering this type of questions a
more relevant approach is to employ methods which are independent of the ordering of
income factors.
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The results of the decomposition of the income inequality, as measured by the A-
coefficient, are given in Tables 5 and 6. As a supplement, corresponding results for the Gini
coefficient are given in Appendix 2.
Table 5. Decomposition of the A-coefficient*) in distributions of household income for
couples with one child living in urban Sichuan with respect to (1) wage earnings
in state-owned units, (2) wage earnings in collective-owned units, (3) other income















1 89.4 66.6 0.235
1986 2 -17.9 15.5 -0.202
(0.175) 3 10.1 8.9 0.199
4 3.5 0.9 0.656
5 14.9 8.1 0.326
1 80.7 67.3 0.234
1987 2 -9.3 14.5 -0.124
(0.195) 3 10.4 8.2 0.247
4 2.7 0.8 0.678
5 15.5 9.2 0.328
1 91.0 61.0 0.341
1988 2 -15.1 13.4 -0.257
(0.228) 3 11.1 9.0 0.282
4 3.2 9.0 0.080
5 9.8 7.6 0.296
1 93.6 60.6 0.353
1989 2 -15.2 12.8 -0.269
(0.228) 3 11.3 8.8 0.294
4 4.1 11.0 0.085
5, 6.2 6.8.	 , 0.211
1 92.2 61.2 0.342
1990 2 -18.6 12.5 -0.338
(0.227) 3 12.5 8.8 0.321
4 3.7 10.4 0.081
5 10.1 7.1 0.324
*) The estimated A-coefficients are given in parentheses.
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Table 6. Decomposition of the A-coefficient* ) in distributions of household income for
couples with one child living in urban Liaoning with respect to (1) wage earnings
in state-owned units, (2) wage earnings in collective-owned units, (3) other income















1 99.0 63.7 0.254
1986 2 -18.5 21.4 -0.141
(0.164) 3 10.3 7.2 0.233
4 1.3 0.7 0.314
5 7.9.	 . 7.0 0.184
1 115.3 51.6 0.350
1987 2 -36.1 29.3 -0.193
(0.157) 3 6.7 8.7 0.121
4 -4.9 0.5 -1.595
5 19.0 9.9 0.301
1 98.1 53.6 0.351
1988 2 -25.3 22.4 -0.216
(0.192) 3 7.2 7.5 0.184
4 5.1 9.5 0.102
5 14.9 7.0 0.411
1 62.9 52.6 0.392
1989 2 12.4 21.7 0.187
(0.328) 3 9.6 8.7 0.360
4 5.9 10.0 0.192
5 9.2 7.0 0.432
1 104.4 53.7 0.354
1990 2 -23.0 21.8 -0.192
(0.182) 3 8.7 8.2 0.193
4 0.4 9.7 0.007
5 9.5 6.6	 -	
0.264
*) The estimated A-coefficients are given in parentheses.
The first and the second column of Tables 5 and 6 display each income factor's
relative contribution to overall inequality and to total income, respectively. The third column
gives the concentration coefficients. Table 5 shows that all income factors, except wage
earnings in collective-owned units, has a disequalizing effect on the distributions of income
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for couples with one child living in urban Sichuan. The major income factor, wage earnings
in state-owned units, accounted for 60-68 per cent of total income and for 80-94 per cent of
overall inequality. By contrary, wage earnings in collective-owned units reduced inequality
by 9-19 per cent. The predominating contribution from wage earnings in state-owned units
on household income inequality is in accordance with the findings of Hu et al. (1986) that
wages and bonus payments are greatly influenced by affiliation to state-owned enterprises.
. From 1986 to 1987 the increased inequality was mainly due to a reduced equalizing effect
of wage earnings in collective-owned units. The corresponding concentration coefficient
increased from -0.202 to -0.124. Between 19884990 the concentration coefficient of wage
earnings in collective-owned units decreased below its 1987 value, while this income factor's
fraction of total income stabilized on about 13 per cent. Thus, during the 19884990 period
wage earnings in collective-owned units again increased its equalizing effect. Despite this fact,
income inequality, as measured by the A-coefficient, increased by 17 per cent from 1987 to
1988 and was steady at its 1988 level up to 1990. The increased income inequality was
mainly due to a rising disequalizing effect of wage earnings in state-owned units. This effect
was not outweighed by a declining disequalizing effect of income from current transfers.
During the 1988-1990 period income from current transfers accounted for 9-11 per cent of
total income and merely of 34 per cent of inequality, which means that income from current
transfers was approximately evenly distributed across couples with one child living in urban
Sichuan. The notable decline in the income fraction of wage earnings in state-owned units
from the 1986-1987 period to the 19884990 period was accompanied by a corresponding
increase in the income fraction of income from current transfers. This fact is due to a change
in the reporting routines between 1987 and 1988, when compensation for increasing food
prices changed classification from being included in wage earnings to be included in current
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transfers. Nevertheless, the change in reporting mutines do not distort our main conclusion
of a rising disequalizing effect of wage earnings in state-owned units.
The results for urban Liaoning, reported in Table 6, roughly correspond to the changes
reported for urban Sichuan. We shall, however, comment upon some noteworthy exceptions.
Firstly, the atypical large income inequality in 1989 was mainly due to the fact that the effect
of wage earnings in collective-owned units changed from being equalizing in 1988 to be
disequalizirig in 1989. By 1990, wage earnings from collective-owned units again contributed
to reduced income inequality. Secondly, the income fraction of wage earnings in collective-
owned units was about 9 per cent points larger in urban Liaoning than in urban Sichuan,
while the income fraction of wage earnings in state-owned units was about 8 per cent lower.
Thirdly, in contrast to urban Sichuan income from current transfers contributed significantly
to income inequality in 1989. By 1990, however, this income factor had a neutral impact on
income inequality among couples with one child, irrespective of province. This means that
income from current transfers was evenly distributed across couples with one child living in
urban Liaoning and Sichuan, respectively.
For both provinces the above decomposition results for the 1986-1990 period reveal
that wage earnings in collective-owned units along with wage earnings in state-owned units
were the predominating income sources of the poor couples with one child and that wage
earnings in state-owned units was the predominating income source of the rich couples.
Next, by using (2.16) and the estimates of Tables 5 and 6 we derive effects on income
inequality from marginal changes of one income factor while the remaining income factors
are kept fixed. During the 1986-1990 period, a small increase in wage earnings in state-owned
units would have caused the largest increase in income inequality among couples with one
child, irrespective of province. In Sichuan the elasticity of wage earnings in state-owned units
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was steady about 0.3 between 1988 and 1990. By contrast, the corresponding elasticity for
Liaoning varies between 0.1 and 0.5. The main explanation for this variation was the atypical
high level of income inequality in 1989. If, however, we had increased wage earnings in
collective-owned units in 1990 by 1 per cent, then income inequality among couples with one
child living in urban Sichuan and Liaoning would be reduced by 0.3 per cent and 0.4 per
cent, respectively. For the interpretation of these results, however, note that possible effects
of behavioral responses are disregarded.
5. Per capita household income
In Section 3 we mainly focused on the differences in economic well-being among
couples with one child. However, also a few results including all households were reported.
As a basis for welfare judgements, however, these results must be interpreted with caution.
This is, inter alia, due to variation in household size and composition. To deal with these
problems the standard approach is to construct an equivalence scale. Our approach is simply
to employ household income divided by household size as welfare indicator. However, if
important economies of scale are present then this method will underestimate the welfare
levels of large households relative to smaller ones. In many analyses of welfare this is the
major argument for introducing adult equivalents, where additional household members are
given weights less than unity. For example, children are often given a weight equal to one-
half of an adult. The standard practice, however, is to construct equivalence scales on the
basis of empirical consumer demand models. This practice is controversial since demand data
are uninformative with respect to interpersonal welfare comparability. Thus, although the
equivalence scale approach certainly is attractive from a theoretical point of view, it suffers
from arbitrary choices of the cardinal dimension of welfare (see Pollak and Wales (1979),
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Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), Fisher (1987), and Blundell and Lewbel (1991)). For the
interpretation of the results in this section it is important to bear these difficulties in mind.
Moreover, the present results concern individuals rather than households and are, for that
reason, based on the additional assumption that the welfare level of an individual is equal to
per capita household income of the household within which he/she actually lives.
Table 7 provides estimates of the mean, the A-coefficient and the Gini coefficient in
distributions of per capita household income among persons.
Table 7. Estimates of the mean*), the A-coefficient and the Gini coefficient in distributions
of per capita household income among persons living in urban Sichuan and
Liaoning, 1986-1990
Province Sichuan Liaoning
Year 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Number of
observations 2115 2103 1846 1784 1784 2300 2112 2034 2027 1983
Mean 1529 1536 1541 1492 1643 1326 1600 1645 1537 1708
(11) (10) (12) (12) (14) (8) (9) (10) (12) (11)
A-coefficient .254 .248 .279 .280 .274 .237 .721 .218 .331 .724
(.004) (.004) (.005) (.005) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.007) (.004)
Gini coefficient .170 .170 .190 .189 .187 .157 .148 .146 .200 .147
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.005) (.003)
, 	
*) Yuan figures are at 1990 prices. Standard deviations are given in parentheses.
The major trend in per capita household income inequality among persons is, as
displayed by Table 7, roughly in correspondance with the findings in Section 3 about income
inequality among households. There are, however, some noteworthy exceptions. Firstly, while
income inequality among all households and among couples with one child living in urban
Sichuan increased between 1986 and 1987, per capita income inequality among persons did
not change. Secondly, except for an atypical high level of inequality in 1989, per capita
income inequality among persons living in urban Liaoning roughly kept fixed during the
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19864990 period. By contrast, income inequality among all households increased between
1986 and 1988, while income inequality among couples with one child increased from
1986/1987 to 1988.
6. Summary and conclusions
The 1980's has been a period of economic reforms and growth in China. China's new
economic system is characterized by the introduction of market forces combined with market
regulations and public ownership. The question is whether or not the success in the Chinese
economy has improved the overall level of living in urban regions of the provinces Sichuan
and Liaoning and if so whether or not this improvement has been attained at the cost of
increased income inequality. This paper discusses this question by means of individual
household data from the State Statistical Bureau's Urban Household Survey for urban Sichuan
and Liaoning during the 19864990 period.
As a result of the current birth control policy in China couples with one child turn out
to be the dominating household group accounting for roughly 35 per cent of the households
in Sichuan and 50 per cent of the households in Liaoning. For that reason this particular
household group is emphasized in this study.
Our findings show that the 1986-1990 period was one of relatively steady growth in
mean real income of couples with one child living in urban Liaoning, while the corresponding
mean real income in urban Sichuan did not change much during this period of time. As a
result of this development, the mean real income in urban Sichuan changed from being 12 per
cent above the mean real income in urban Liaoning in 1986 to a level of 5 per cent below
the mean real income in urban Liaoning in 1990. This particular pattern is even more visual
among the poor couples with one child where the difference in mean real income between
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urban Sichuan and Liaoning already switched in 1987 from being highest in Sichuan to
becoming highest in Liaoning. However, the increase in level of well-being among couples
with one child in urban Liaoning was achieved at the cost of increased inequality. Although
the urban Sichuan couples with one child did not increase their level of living during the
19864990 period they still experienced increased inequality. Thus a higher degree of
inequality in Sichuan than in Liaoning in 1986 was maintained during this period of time.
In order to give an interpretation of the magnitude of changes in inequality the paper
introduces a convenient intervention method. Based on the Gini coefficient, the income
inequality among couples with one child living in urban Sichuan and Liaoning increased
between 1986 and 1990 by 29 and 14 per cent, respectively. In Sichuan this increase in
inequality corresponds to an intervention consisting of an equal-sized lump sum tax equal to
29 per cent of the mean income in 1986 followed by a redistribution of the collected tax
revenue as proportional transfers equal to 29 per cent of each couple's income in 1986. Thus,
this specific intervention corresponds to a series of regressive transfers, each of which
increases inequality.
So far we have only referred to results that concerns couples with one child. The
results for all households are in line with those indicated for couples with one child. However,
due to heterogeneity in household size and composition the level of inequality was
substantially higher for all households than for couples with one child.
In order to identify the sources that made substantial contributions to the level and
changes in level of inequality during the 1986-1990 period, the annual overall inequality was
decomposed with respect to five basic income factors. Our findings for Sichuan show that the
major income factor, wage earnings in state-owned units, accounted for 60-68 per cent of total
income and for 80-94 per cent of overall inequality. The predominating contribution from
26
wage earnings in state-owned units on household income inequality is generally a result of
the Chinese wage system where wages and bonus payments are greatly influenced by
affiliation to state-owned enterprises. The observed increase in income inequality during the
1986-1990 period was mainly due to a rising disequalizing effect of wage earnings in state-
owned units. The results for urban Liaoning roughly corresponds to the structure reported for
urban Sichuan. The disequalizing effect of wage earnings in state-owned units, however, were
even stronger in Liaoning than in Sichuan. For both provinces the decomposition results
reveal that wage earnings in collective-owned units along with wage earnings in state-owned
units were the predominating income sources among the poor couples while wage earnings
in state-owned units was the predominating income source among the rich couples.
27
References
Aaberge, R. (1986): "On the Problem of Measuring Inequality", Discussion Paper No. 14,
Central Bureau of Statistics, Oslo, Norway.
Aaberge, R., Chen, X., Li, J. and X. Li (1992): "The Structure of Economic Inequality Among
Households Living in Urban Sichuan and Liaoning, 1990", Discussion Paper No. 70,
Central Bureau of Statistics, Oslo, Norway.
Atkinson, AB. (1970): "On the Measurement of Inequality", Journal of Economic Theory, 2,
244-263.
Blackburn, ML. (1989): "Interpreting the Magnitude of Changes in Measures of Income
Inequality", Journal of Econometrics, 42, 21-25.
Blank, R. and A. Blinder (1986): "Macroeconomics, Income Distribution, and Poverty", in S.
Danziger and D. Weinberg, eds., Fighting Poverty: What Works and What Doesn't,
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Blundell, R. and A. Lewbel (1991): "The Information Content of Equivalence Scales", Journal
of Econometrics, 50, 49-68.
Danziger, S., Gottschalk, P. and E. Smolensky (1989): "How the Rich Have Fared, 1973-87",
American Economic Review Proceedings, Vol. 79, No. 2, 310-314.
Danziger, S. (1980): "Do Working Wives Increase Family Income Inequality?", Journal of
Human Resources, 15, 444-451.
Deaton, A. and J. Muellbauer (1980): Economics and Consumer Behaviour, Cambridge
University Press.
Fisher, F.M. (1987): "Household Equivalence Scales and Interpersonal Comparisons", Review
of Economic Studies, 54, 519-524.
Horvath, F.W. (1980): "Working Wives Reduce Inequality in Distribution of Family
Earnings", Monthly Labor Review, 51-52.
Hu, T., Li, M. and S. Shi (1986): Analysis of Wages and Bonus Payments Among Tianjin
Urban Workers", The China Quarterly, 79-93.
Mahalanobis, P.C. (1960): "A Method of Fractile Graphical Analysis", Econometrica, 28,
325-351.
Pollak, RA. and T. J. Wales (1979): "Welfare Comparisons and Equivalence Scales",
American Economic Review, 69, 216-221.
Sen, A. (1973): On Economic Ineauality, Oxford, Clarendon Press.
28
APPENDIX 1
The Urban Household Survey of China
The annual Urban Household Survey of China is a sample survey which covers all
provinces. The survey collects data on household size and composition, employment status,
education level, income structure  and quantities and expenditures by type of commodities.
A particular attractive feature of this survey is its continuity in recording the income
and consumption data. Each household is keeping daily records of its cash income and
consumption quantities and expenditures for monthly collection by survey officials.
The sample of households is selected by adopting a two-stage sampling design. At
each stage stratified systematic sampling is used. In the first stage, a sample of cities and
county towns is selected by the State Statistical Bureau (SSB) and provincial statistical
bureaus. The cities and county towns are according to the size of their non-agricultural
populations selected by means of a systematic sampling procedure. In the second stage 100
households are selected randomly from each selected city and county town. The total sample
size is about 15 000 households. In addition to provide daily income and consumption
accounts the selected households are every month asked questions about household size and
composition and about education and employment status of the household memebers.
In order to reduce non-response and the extent of measurement errors the Urban
Household Survey has been based on a rotation sample since 1988. The rotation proportion
is 1/3 and the rotation period is one year. Furthermore, SSB has also worked out a
comprehensive set of instructions for survey officials in order to improve the data quality. Its
main content deals with the survey officials behavior towards the field operations. They are,
for instance, asked to help the selected households with housework and child cue and
otherwise comply with the households customs.
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Income concepts
Total income is all cash income received by the household during the year, but
excluding such incomes as bank deposits withdrawn, money borrowed from relatives or
friends, and repayment of debt by others.
Wages in state-owned or collective-owned units are the total wages of household
members employed in state-owned or collective-owned enterprises, institutions, government
offices and other organizations. Such wages consist of base wage, bonuses, floating salary and
contractual income. Floating salary is an unfixed salary, the amount of which depends upon
the quality and quantity of work produced. Contractual income is the income that staff and
workers in some state-owned and collective-owned enterprises earn from work they are
contracted to perform. The amount of the contractual income is equal to the total income




Decomposition of the Gini coefficient
Note that Tables 5A and 6A correspond to Tables 5 and 6, respectively.
Table 5A. Decomposition of the Gini coefficient in distributions of household income with
respect to (1) wage earnings in state-owned units, (2) wage earnings in collective-
owned units, (3) other income from work units, (4) income from current transfers















1 90.7 66.6 0.157
1986 2 -24.0 15.5 -0.118
(0.115) 3 10.9 8.9 0.141
4 3.9 0.9 0.499
5 4 18.5 8.1 0.265
1 78.1 67.3 0.147
1987 2 -9.8 14.5 -0.086
(0.126) 3 10.6 8.2 0.164
4 3.4 0.8 0.561
, 5 17.7 9.2 0.241
1 86.6 61.0 0.221
1988 2 -15.1 13.4 -0.174
(0.156) 3 11.7 9.0 0.204
4 2.2 9.0 0.039
5 14.4 7.6 0.295
1 88.2 60.6 0.220
1989 2 -12.7 12.8 -0.149
(0.151) 3 11.1 8.8 0.191
4 2.4 11.0 0.033
5 11.0 6.8 0.247
1 89.3 61.2 0.216
1990 2 -15.8 12.5 -0.188
(0.145) 3 13.2 8.8 0.221
4 1.3 10.4 0.019
1	 5 12.0 7.1 0.250
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Table 6A. Decomposition of the Gini coefficient in distributions of household income with
respect to (1) wage earnings in state-owned units, (2) wage earnings in collective
owned units, (3) other income from work units, (4) income from current transfers















1 108.7 63.7 0.182
1986 2 -25.6 21.4 -0.127
(0.107) 3 8.0 7.2 0.119
4 1.9 0.7 0.298
5 7.0 7.0 0.106
1 108.1 51.6 0.214
1987 2 -35.7 29.3 -0.125
(0.102) 3 5.4 8.7 0.064
4 -0.2 0.5 -0.038
5 22.4 9.9 0.231
1 94.3 53.6 0.219
1988 2 \-23.8 22.4 -0.133
(0.125) 3 7.2 7.5 0.199
4 4.0 9.5 0.052
5 18.3 7.0 0.331
1 65.8 52.6 0.235
1989 2 8.6 21.7 0.074
(0.188) 3 10.1 8.7 0.217
4 4.5 10.0 0.084
5 11.0 7.0 0.299
1 100.2 53.7 0.228
1990 2 -24.2 21.8 -0.136
(0.122) 3 8.1 8.2 0.121
4 -0.4 9.7 -0.005
5 16.3 6.6 0.303
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